Rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT) is a psychotherapeutic approach based on the premise that when individuals are faced with adversity, irrational beliefs determine unhealthy negative emotions and maladaptive behaviors, whereas rational beliefs lead to healthy and adaptive alternatives. The detrimental effects of irrational beliefs on psychological health are established; however, less is known about their deleterious effects on human behavior and performance. In the present study, we examined the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on motor-skill performance (Experiment 1), performance effectiveness, and efficiency during a modified hazard-perception task, and on persistence during a breath-holding task (Experiment 2). Using a repeatedmeasures counterbalanced design, we recruited 2 cohorts of 35 undergraduate university students for Experiments 1 and 2, each participating in no self-statement, irrational, and rational self-statement conditions. Data indicated no differences in motor-skill and task performance, performance efficiency, task persistence, mental effort, and preperformance anxiety between irrational and rational self-statement conditions. In contrast to previous research, our findings provide insight into a juxtaposition that irrational beliefs hinder psychological health yet may help performance, highlighting important distinctions in factual and practical rationality that have been overlooked within the extant literature. The findings have important practical implications for practitioners who may look to REBT to enhance the psychological health and performance for individuals who operate in high-performance contexts. Further, the short-and longterm effects of irrational and rational beliefs on performance and psychological health warrants greater investigation.
Rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1957) was created by Albert Ellis in 1955 and is summarized by the ancient proverb "people are not disturbed by things, but by the view they take of them" ; Epictetus, 1948) . Central to REBT is the premise that irrational beliefs lead to psychological disturbance, whereas rational beliefs lead to enhanced psychological well-being (David, Szentagotai, Eva, & Macavei, 2005) . Using the AB-CDE framework (Ellis & Dryden, 1997) , the process of REBT aims to identify the clients activating event (A) and elicit the relevant irrational beliefs (B) that lead to the corresponding unhealthy negative emotions and maladaptive behaviors (C). Irrational beliefs are then disputed (D) and replaced with rational alternatives (E); thus, when encountering future adversities, individuals will experience healthy negative emotions and adaptive behaviors that facilitate goal achievement (C; Dryden & Branch, 2008; Turner & Barker, 2014) . Essentially, REBT allows clients to comprehend that in the face of failure, rejection, and poor treatment, it is their beliefs that determine the functionality of their emotional and behavioral response (C), not the event (A). Irrational beliefs are characterized as extreme, rigid, and illogical, and when encountering adversity (i.e., failure, rejection, or poor treatment) they lead to unhealthy negative emotions (e.g., anxiety, depression) that propagate maladaptive behaviors (i.e., avoidance or escape-based behaviors) and hinder goal achievement (Dryden & Branch, 2008) . Instead, rational beliefs are nonextreme, flexible, and logical, and when encountering adversity, they are purported to lead to healthy negative emotions (e.g., concern, sadness) that facilitate adaptive behaviors (i.e., approach or assertive behaviors). When encountering adversity, an individual's beliefs are central in determining the functionality of emotional and behavioral responses towards goal achievement (Ellis & Dryden, 1997) , consequently having clear implications for those operating in performance contexts.
Presently there exists an extensive body of research demonstrating the association between irrational beliefs and psychological distress. To illustrate, a recent meta-analysis of 83 primary studies reported a moderate positive association between irrational beliefs and general distress (r ϭ .36), depression (r ϭ .33), anxiety (r ϭ .41), anger (r ϭ .25), and guilt (r ϭ .29; Vîslȃ, Flückiger, grosse Holtforth, & David, 2016) . Furthermore, the efficacy of REBT on psychological health has been supported with hundreds of studies and three previous meta-analyses (e.g., Engels, Garnefski, & Diekstra, 1993) . Originally REBT was put forth as a clinical model of therapy, and despite much research demonstrating the association between irrational beliefs and deleterious emotional and behavioral consequences, less is known about the effects of rational beliefs and/or irrational beliefs on human behavior and performance (Turner & Barker, 2014) . This is surprising because REBT is widely considered to offer a model of human functioning (David, Freeman, & Digiuseppe, 2010) . For those who operate in challenging and demanding contexts (e.g., business, elite sport, military), a rational philosophy (i.e., the endorsement of rational beliefs that are supported empirically, logically, and pragmatically) offers a proactive approach that facilitates psychological health and goal achievement (Turner, 2016) . Furthermore, the use of REBT has been reported across various performance settings, such as sport (e.g., Turner & Barker, 2014) , education, and business (e.g., Criddle, 2007) .
Rational beliefs are proposed to reduce excessive concerns about failure and likely to lead to a healthy negative emotion (e.g., concern) and exert a positive influence on performance (Kombos, Fournet, & Estes, 1989) . Irrational beliefs are proposed to lead to an exaggeration of the importance of performing well and being accepted by others, which may lead to unreasonable and self-imposed demands that are largely unattainable (Bonadies & Bass, 1984) . Furthermore, the anticipation that it would be "awful" (100% bad) when faced with failure, rejection, or poor treatment may lead to an unhealthy negative emotion (e.g., anxiety) and therefore hinder performance (Turner & Barker, 2014) . Among the scant evidence base, Schill, Monroe, Evans, and Ramanaiah (1978) first showed that the adoption of irrational self-talk led to significantly more errors on a mirrortracing task (i.e., reduced behavioral efficiency) compared to rational self-talk and control conditions. Additionally, the adoption of irrational self-talk has also been associated with reduced performance efficiency and increased anxiety during a mirror-tracing task (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984) , as well as reduced performance during a series of trail-making tasks (Kombos et al., 1989) . Nevertheless, studies have reported only partial support for this hypothesis. For example, researchers have reported that participants who adopted rational self-talk instead of irrational self-talk reported decreased anxiety, whereas they report no differences in persistence during an insolvable performance task (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) . Evidence has indicated the adoption of irrational self-talk may hinder task performance and reduce behavioral efficiency (e.g., Bonadies, & Bass, 1984; Kombos et al., 1989; Schill et al., 1978) ; however, findings have remained inconclusive due to a lack of critical mass and methodological shortcomings within the extant studies.
To explain, previous studies have largely relied upon the use of imagined rather than real stressful events, but irrational self-statements are thought to activate only during real-life and meaningful situations (e.g., Ellis, 1994) . Previous studies have also failed to include a control group (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984) , used leading statements (e.g., participants were told these statements would help reduce errors in performance; Schill et al., 1978) , failed to discern the believability of the self-statements (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983; Schill et al., 1978) , and used performance tasks that lack in ecological validity (i.e., mirror-tracing task; e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984) . Further, although researchers have suggested that self-talk is better characterized in terms of directional interpretation (e.g., Hardy, 2006) , no studies have yet matched the perceived helpfulness of irrational and/or rational self-talk statements with performance outcomes. On these grounds, the investigation into the effects of irrational and rational self-talk on performance warrants more rigorous examination.
The effects of irrational beliefs and/or rational beliefs on performance, not restricted to experimental settings, have been tested through the examination of REBT on important psychological outcomes (e.g., anxiety, perceived control) and competitive performance in elite sport. For example, researchers indicated that reductions in irrational beliefs were coupled with reductions in cognitive anxiety (e.g., ; enhanced facilitative interpretations of anxiety (e.g., Larner, Morris, & Marchant, 2007) ; and perceived psychological and performance benefits (Turner, Slater, & Barker, 2013) , as well as short-and long-term improvements in self-efficacy, perception of control, and athletic performance (A. G. Wood, Barker, & Turner, 2017) . Collectively, the applied data have indicated irrational beliefs may hinder athletic performance, whereas rational beliefs may be helpful for it. However, little research has included objective markers to assess the effects of REBT on performance (Turner, 2016) ; as well, the samples (i.e., elite athletes) constrain the external validity of the study findings across other performance settings. Ultimately, the effects of rational and irrational beliefs on important psychological outcomes, behaviors, and performance have yet to be established and require further enquiry (A. G. Wood et al., 2017) .
In sum, there is a paucity of objective and empirical research that examines the effects of irrational beliefs and/or rational beliefs on performance. Moving beyond previous research methods and shortcomings, in the current study we aimed to conduct a rigorous examination into the effects of irrational and rational beliefs on behavior using measures of competitive performance. We add to the extant literature by examining the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on cognitions, emotions, and performance. To illustrate, in Experiment 1 we used a laboratory-based competitive golfputting task as a measure of motor-skill performance (e.g., Wulf & Su, 2007) . In Experiment 2 we used a modified hazard-perception task (HPT) as an objective measure of performance efficiency (visual search behavior) and performance effectiveness (hazard-perception performance). In addition, a breath-holding task (BHT) was used to measure task persistence.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we examined the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on performance outcomes, preperformance anxiety, concentration disruption, and the perceived helpfulness of self-statements. Previous research has demonstrated that participants who adopt irrational self-statements record lower behavioral efficiency during a visual-spatial task compared to participants who adopt rational self-statements (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Kombos et al., 1989; Schill et al., 1978) . Similarly, in Experiment 1 we used self-statements closely aligned with REBT theory (DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013) to promote irrational and rational performance approaches to a competitive golf-putting task (e.g., Wulf & Su, 2007) and assess performance. Addressing the limitations of past research (i.e., tasks lacked in ecological validity), we used a motor-skill task as a measure of performance while controlling for participants' total irrational belief scores. Furthermore, we (a) incorporated a real-life motivated performance situation rather than imagined scenario using competitive task instructions (e.g., Turner, Jones, Sheffield, & Cross, 2012) , (b) controlled for participants' current (baseline) task proficiency, and (c) ascertained participants' perception of the self-statements in terms of helpfulness and believability. It was hypothesized that, based on previous research, when participants used irrational self-statements they would report higher levels of preperformance anxiety and higher performance concentration disruption and achieve lower performance scores in the competitive golf-putting task compared to when they used rational selfstatements. Finally, we hypothesized partici-pants would perceive the rational self-statements to be more helpful toward the performance task but report no differences in believability between self-statement conditions.
Method
Participants. Previous research most akin to the present study (i.e., examined effects of IBs, had a similar research design and measures; Vîslȃ et al., 2016; M. R. Wilson, Wood, & Vine, 2009 ) reported moderate to large effects, thus supporting the expectation for medium effects. An a priori power analysis using G ‫ء‬ Power 3 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Bauchner, 1996) showed that based on a medium effect size ( 2 ϭ .06) and a power of .80, a minimum of 28 participants was required for the present study. Thirty-five undergraduate students (26 male; M age ϭ 20.92, SD ϭ 5.62, range ϭ 18 -53) were purposively recruited at a university in the United Kingdom. Institutional ethical approval and participant consent were obtained prior to all data collection, and a power analysis was considered as part of the peer review process.
Measures.
Trait irrational beliefs. The Shortened General Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (SGABS; Lindner, Kirkby, Wertheim, & Birch, 1999) was used as a measure of total irrational beliefs. Consisting of 22 items, the total irrational belief subscale reported a good internal reliability score of ␣ ϭ .84. The rational belief subscale consisted of four items and reported an unacceptable internal reliability score of ␣ ϭ .38 and was therefore omitted from the data analysis process. Participants reported on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) the extent they agreed with each statement.
Preperformance anxiety. The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) includes 20 items that assess preperformance state anxiety. Participants reported their answers on a 4-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). A Cronbach's alpha coefficient reported an excellent internal reliability score (␣ ϭ .93).
Concentration disruption. Items associated with concentration disruption were taken from the Sport Anxiety Scale-2 (Smith, Smoll, Cumming, & Grossbard, 2006) , measuring concentration during the competitive performance task.
Participants reported on a 4-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). The concentration disruption subscale consisted of four items and reported an excellent reliability score of ␣ ϭ .93.
Golf-putting performance. The competitive performance task consisted of 10 putts. The target consisted of a putting hole worth 10 points, surrounded by four concentric circles separated at 5-cm intervals, with each circle from the center hole scored with 8, 6, 4, and 2 points, respectively. Zero points were scored if the ball landed outside the outermost concentric circle or participants exceeded the 10-s time limit allocated to each competitive putt. A maximum of 100 points and a minimum of 0 points were available for the 10 competitive putts for each experimental condition.
Task engagement. To discern participants' motivation toward the competitive performance task, engagement was measured using a single item rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely).
Self-statement perception. Participants' perceptions (i.e., the helpfulness, believability, and engagement) of the self-statements were determined using three items rated on a 7-point Likert-scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 7 (completely).
Procedure. Participants attended the lab individually on three separate occasions, first completing a baseline condition (A; no selfstatements), then completing irrational (B) and rational (C) self-statement conditions in a counterbalanced design (ABC/ACB; Foley, 2004;  see Figure 1 ).
Laboratory setup. Before participants attended the lab, a survey link using Qualtrics software (September 2014 -December 2015 was e-mailed to them to collect total irrational belief scores. On arrival, participants were briefed on the research protocol and the expectations of their involvement. To control for learning effects, we first had participants familiarize themselves with the golf-putting task during the baseline condition.
Competitive task instructions. Next, competitive task instructions were read to the participants to create a motivated performance situation (e.g., Turner et al., 2012) . The instructions emphasized the task demands prior to the performance task and minimized possible reductions in task motivation and effort over successful trials (e.g., M. R. Wilson et al., 2009) . Specifically, the participants were informed that their scores would be compared and ranked on a publicly available leader board, and the winner for each condition would be awarded a cash prize of £25 (US$31; e.g., Barker, Jones, & Greenlees, 2010) . The task instructions also emphasized the time constraints, uncertainty, evaluation, and effort that would be required to complete the performance task.
Self-statements. Following the task instructions during the baseline condition, participants were asked to self-report their preperformance anxiety and motivation toward the upcoming golf-putting task. During the irrational and rational self-statement conditions, prior to completing the self-report measures participants were instead asked to engage with and adopt a set of self-statements. Each set consisted of one self-statement for each of the four core beliefs central to REBT theory (Dryden & Branch, 2008) . The extent to which self-statements were understandable was examined in a pilot study (N ϭ 8) with minor structural and content alterations being made. Self-statements were worded in reference to the achievement content area and the competitive golf-putting task (available on request from the first author). Specifically, irrational and rational beliefs each consist of four core beliefs that were dichotomously matched and related to a single content area (e.g., control, comfort, achievement; DiGiuseppe et al., 2013) . Irrational beliefs consisted of the core beliefs of demandingness (e.g., "I really would like to be successful, therefore I must"); low frustration tolerance (e.g., "If I am not successful it would be intolerable"); awfulizing (e.g., "if I was not successful it would awful"); and downing the self, other, or life (e.g., not being successful would make me a complete failure"). Rational beliefs consisted of the four core beliefs of preferences (e.g., "I would like to be successful, but that does not mean I have to"), antiawfulizing (e.g., "not being successful would be bad but certainly not terrible"), high frustration tolerance (e.g., "although I would like to be successful, not being so would be tolerable"), and unconditional selfacceptance (e.g., "not winning does not make me a complete failure, only that I have failed this time and this shows that I am a fallible human being"). To check understanding of the self-statements, participants were asked to detail and summarize the content in their own words. Following this, participants then selfreported their preperformance anxiety and motivation toward the upcoming golf-putting task (see online Appendix C for self-statements).
Golf-putting performance task. After completing the questionnaires, participants were instructed when to begin and that the task would end when they had played all 10 golf putts. Immediately prior to the golf-putting task, participants were reminded that their performance was being video-recorded and was to be evaluated by an expert golfing coach, that they only had 10 s to play each putt, and that their score would be placed on a leader board that was accessible to all participants. Between every two putts they were instructed to engage with the self-statements by using a cue card located next to the putting position (see online Appendix A for data collection process).
Data analysis. Prior to the main analyses, data-screening procedures were completed. To limit the effect of outlying values, self-report data with z score values greater than Ϯ3 were winsorized and replaced with the smallest or highest untrimmed score (Keselman, Algina, Lix, Wilcox, & Deering, 2008) . A ShapiroWilks test was conducted on all data sets to test Figure 1 . Diagrammatic representation of the datacollection protocols for the golf-putting task (Experiment 1), hazard-perception task (Experiment 2, Phase 1), and breath-holding task (Experiment 2, Phase 2) for no, irrational and rational self-statement conditions. for assumptions of normality. A one-way analysis of covariance was completed to compare the effects of irrational and rational selfstatements (condition-predictor variable) with dependent variables while controlling for baseline scores (baseline covariate) and the effects of total irrational beliefs (covariate). Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure that there was no violation of assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliable measurement of the covariate. In cases where the dependent variables were correlated, a multivariate analysis of covariance was performed (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002) . Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, and no covariates were highly correlated with one another (r Ͼ .08). Effect size values (eta-squared) were interpreted in line with guidelines presented by Cohen (1988) : 01 ϭ small effect, .06 ϭ moderate effect, .14 ϭ large effect.
Results

Preliminary analyses.
Manipulation checks. To test the participants' understanding of the self-statements, the lead author subjectively assessed the content of the written summaries in accordance with the four core beliefs central to REBT theory (Dryden & Branch, 2008) . To test whether the participants' irrational and rational beliefs during the golf-putting task were successfully manipulated, we examined the participants' adoption of irrational and rational self-statements using a single engagement item on the selfstatement perception scale. Statistical analysis revealed that regardless of the condition, participants were engaged with the self-statements (M ϭ 4.44, SD ϭ 1.34), t(69) ϭ 27.80, p Ͻ .001. In addition, statistical analysis revealed that concerning engagement with the selfstatements, participants did not differentiate between the irrational (M ϭ 4.37, SD ϭ 1.44), and rational (M ϭ 4.51, SD ϭ 1.25) self-statement, F(1, 33) ϭ .33, p ϭ .57, conditions. Task engagement. The participant's engagement toward the golf-putting performance task was assessed using a single item on a self-report scale. Statistical analysis revealed that regardless of the condition, participants were motivated toward the golf-putting performance (M ϭ 5.30, SD ϭ .89), t(104) ϭ 61.16, p Ͻ .001. Further, participants did not differ in task engagement between baseline (M ϭ 5.29 SD ϭ .83) and the irrational (M ϭ 5.23, SD ϭ .88), rational (M ϭ 5.37, SD ϭ .98), and selfstatement, F(2, 33) ϭ .35, p ϭ .71, conditions.
Main analyses. Three one-way analyses of covariance were used to investigate differences in golf-putting performance, performance anxiety, and concentration disruption between irrational and rational self-statement conditions. After adjusting for baseline scores and trait irrational beliefs, analysis revealed no significant differences in putting performance F(1, 32) ϭ 2.27, p ϭ .14, Wilks's ϭ . Table 1 ). A multivariate analysis of covariance was conducted to investigate whether participants differed in their perceived helpfulness and believability of irrational self-statements (ISS) and rational self-statements (RSS). After controlling for the effect of trait irrational beliefs, analysis revealed no significant effects for perceived helpfulness (ISS: M ϭ 3.66, SD ϭ 2.26; RSS: M ϭ 3.43, SD ϭ 1.79) and believability (ISS: M ϭ 4.46, SD ϭ 1.88; RSS: M ϭ 5.03, SD ϭ 1.48), F(2, 32) ϭ 1.15, p ϭ .33, Wilks's ϭ .93, 2 ϭ .07.
Discussion
Past literature has suggested that irrational beliefs should hinder performance, whereas rational beliefs should help performance, but research to date has not examined acute skill performance as conducted in the current study. In sum, data evidenced no differences in motorskill performance, preperformance anxiety, concentration disruption, perceived helpfulness, or believability of the statements between the irrational and rational self-statement conditions. Data do not support the study hypotheses or previous research findings (e.g., Bonadies, & Bass, 1984; Kombos et al., 1989; , indicating that acute performance was not differentiated by irrational and rational approaches to a competitive task. Further, participants perceived no differences in the helpfulness of irrational and rational selfstatements toward the competitive golf-putting task. Nevertheless, performance outcomes alone (e.g., task score) may not fully reflect the complexity of skilled performance. For example, previous research used visual spatial tasks (e.g., mirror tracing) as a measure of performance efficiency, indicating that irrational selftalk led to reductions in performance efficiency but not necessarily competitive performance outcomes (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Schill et al., 1978) . In contrast to the results in previous research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) , our results also show the adoption of irrational selfstatements compared to rational self-statements did not determine higher levels of preperformance anxiety or concentration disruption. This may be explained by, first, the fact that contemporary REBT theory posits that healthy (e.g., concern) and unhealthy (e.g., anxiety) negative emotions are distinguished by functionality rather than intensity (Hyland & Boduszek, 2012) . Hence, one may expect to observe changes in functionality via the assessment of participants' perceived helpfulness of anxiety. Second, the measurement of anxiety via selfreport may not accurately reflect preperformance emotional responses, due to social desirability (e.g., J. M. Williams & Krane, 1992) ; thus, more objective markers are warranted. Previous research has evidenced greater physiological arousal (measured via galvanic skin response) when adopting irrational selfstatements compared to rational self-statements (e.g., Master & Gershman, 1983) . Therefore, objective markers of physiological arousal may yield more accurate findings. Accordingly, a more refined and detailed investigation into the precise influence of irrational and rational selfstatements across various psychophysiological outcomes and performance indicators (e.g., efficiency, task persistence, objective outcomes) is warranted.
Experiment 2
In this experiment we examined the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on measures of performance efficiency and effectiveness, task persistence, and competitive task performance outcomes, extending Experiment 1, which measured task performance outcomes only. In Experiment 2 we measured visual gaze behavior (measuring performance efficiency and effectiveness) during a competitive hazardperception task (HPT; Phase 1) and persistence during a breath-holding task (BHT; Phase 2). In line with Experiment 1, preperformance anxiety and concentration disruption were measured. Further building on Experiment 1, we also measured heart rate and perceived helpfulness of anxiety to provide an objective measure of physiological arousal and a directional measure of preperformance anxiety, respectively. According to the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) , emotions such as anxiety may take up available processing resources in the working memory, in turn hindering performance efficiency. However, decrements in efficiency may not be reflected in performance outcomes (e.g., task score), because performance can be maintained (M. Wilson, Smith, Chattington, Ford, & MarpleHorvat, 2006) . Using a hazard-perception task, previous research has evidenced a quicker ability to fixate on a hazard after its appearance underpins hazard-perception performance (Crundall et al., 2012) . In addition, researchers have also shown that an increase in fixation duration to a detected hazard is also indicative of performance effectiveness and increased attentional capture (Garrison & Williams, 2013) . Moving beyond Experiment 1, this was the first study to use markers of visual search behavior as an objective measure of performance efficiency and effectiveness, thus providing a rich dynamic source of psychological processes during the competitive hazard-perception task (Richardson & Spivey, 2004) .
Past laboratory research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983 ) indicated no differences in task persistence between irrational and rational selfstatements. However, researchers have suggested that irrational beliefs may be acutely motivational on the approach to an important competitive event and therefore may lead to greater persistence (Turner, 2016) . Further, REBT practitioners have indicated that irrational beliefs such as "I must succeed" may be considered motivational by performers (Turner & Barker, 2014) . Therefore, in Experiment 2, alongside measuring participants perceived mental effort, we used a breath-holding task (Hajek, Belcher, & Stapleton, 1987) as a raw measure of task persistence while tolerating discomfort (e.g., Sütterlin et al., 2013) .
Drawing on the aforementioned literature, we proposed a series of hypotheses for Experiment 2. First, participants using irrational selfstatements would record reduced performance efficiency, in terms of decreases in both fixation durations to the detected hazard and ability to fixate on the hazard after its appearance (i.e., time elapsed between hazard appearance and first hazard fixation; Crundall et al., 2012) . Second, participants would record worse performance outcomes (hazard-perception score) when adopting irrational self-statements compared to rational self-statements. Finally, participants who adopted irrational self-statements would also record greater task persistence, greater mental effort, higher anxiety intensity, lower perceived helpfulness, and increased physiological arousal (i.e., increased heart rate) compared to when using rational self-statements.
Method
Participants. As in Experiment 1, the effect sizes reported in research similar to the present study (e.g., S. E. Williams & Cumming, 2012; M. Wilson et al., 2006) reinforced the expectation for medium effects. Based upon an a priori power analysis, 35 undergraduates (26 male; M age ϭ 21.09, SDϭ 2.92, range ϭ 18 -30) were purposively recruited at a university in the United Kingdom. All held a full driving license and had been driving for a minimum of 6 months. None of the participants had visual or hearing impairments that impeded their ability to complete the tasks.
Measures. As used in Experiment 1, measures of trait irrational beliefs were collected using the SGABS (␣ ϭ .84).
Preperformance anxiety. To ascertain levels of preperformance anxiety and reduce completion time, we reduced the STAI from 20 to 10 items. These 10 items were selected based upon the best psychometric properties within Form Y of the STAI (Spielberger, 1983) as validated within the State Trait Personality Inventory (Spielberger & Reheiser, 2009) . A Cronbach's alpha coefficient reported excellent internal reliability (␣ ϭ .90). Participants reported on a 7-point Likert-scale ranging from Ϫ3 (not at all helpful) to 3 (extremely helpful) the directional interpretation of their preperformance anxiety in relation to the upcoming competitive task.
Physiological arousal. Participants' heart rate was measured using a MP45 Biopac (Biopac Systems, 2010) to provide an objective and accurate assessment of physiological arousal on approach to both competitive performance tasks (HPT and BHT). Biopac Analysis software (version 4.1) ascertained changes in heart rate scores between the baseline phase (after receiving the self-statements and before the preperformance preparation phase) and the preperformance preparation phase (between starting preperformance preparation and immediately prior to beginning the task).
Hazard-perception performance. An HPT provided an objective measure of task performance (i.e., response time), specifically measuring participants' ability to quickly perceive and respond to a potentially dangerous driving situation (G. Wood, Hartley, Furley, & Wilson, 2016) . Hazard-perception scores were marked out of 20 and measured using response times (milliseconds) between the onset of the hazard and when the participant indicated the presence of a hazard (mouse click). Participants were provided with a window of 5,000 ms, and if a click was not registered, 0 points were awarded. Scores from each clip were summed to produce a final performance score. Hazard-perception performance was assessed using three hazardperception clips, each containing one major developing hazard lasting between 55 and 60 s. Each clip was specific to driving, featured everyday road scenes, contained one developing major hazard, and was fully counterbalanced between conditions.
Eye-tracking and -fixation analyses. Participants' visual search behavior during the appearance of the major hazard provided an objective indicator of performance efficiency and effectiveness (Garrison & Williams, 2013) . First, fixation duration to the detected hazard was measured as an indicator of attentional capture and a predictor of effective hazardperception performance (G. Wood et al., 2016) . Specifically, fixation duration was calculated as a change score of mean fixation duration between the baseline phase (total clip length prior to onset of the major hazard) and the presence of the major hazard. Mean scores were calculated across three hazard-perception clips. In addition, the time taken to fixate on the major hazard after its appearance was measured as an indicator of performance efficiency and predictor of effective hazard-perception performance (Crundall et al., 2012) . Time taken to fixate on the hazard was calculated as mean time elapsed between the appearance of the major hazard and time of first fixation toward the hazard location (milliseconds). A fixation was defined as a gaze that remained on a single location for longer than 100 ms, and the frequency of the gaze was calculated as the mean number of times a location was fixated on (Garrison & Williams, 2013) . SR Research Experiment Builder software (version 1.5.2) monitored patterns of visual gaze behavior via the Eye Link 1,000 sampling at a rate of 2,000 Hz that recorded monocular gaze direction with an accuracy of .25-.5 degrees.
Breath-holding task. The BHT (Hajek et al., 1987) provided a behavioral indicator of task persistence while tolerating discomfort (e.g., Sütterlin et al., 2013) . Breath-holding performance scores were measured in seconds from when the participant initiated the first inhalation until the first exhalation. Participants' compliance with the BHT was measured on a 9-point Likert-scale (a) to what degree they followed the instructions precisely, (b) to what degree they tried to hold their breath as much as possible, and (c) whether they could hold their breath for any longer (Sütterlin et al., 2013) .
Perceived mental effort. The Rating Scale Mental Effort (Zijlstra, 1993) provided a validated unidimensional measure of mental effort. After the completion of both HPT and BHT, participants were required to indicate on a continuous vertical scale the amount of mental effort invested within the task. The scale consists of anchor points ranging from 0 (absolutely no effort), 75 (moderately effortful) to 150 (extreme effort).
Manipulation checks and task engagement. As in Experiment 1, perceptions of selfstatements were collected in reference to both HPT and BHT. Furthermore, participants' motivation toward both competitive performance tasks was measured using a single item. In line with previous research, increases in heart rate were also measured using MP45 Biopac to provide an objective indicator of participants' engagement with the HPT (e.g., Turner et al., 2012) .
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, measures of total irrational beliefs were collected prior to arrival. Participants then attended the lab individually on three separate occasions in a counterbalanced design (ABC/ACB; Foley, 2004) . Experiment 2 spanned two phases, with the study procedure repeated for both the HPT (Phase 1) and BHT (Phase 2) in one testing session (see Figure 1) . Data collection was completed using a combination of onscreen instructions and verbal cues from the researcher (lead author). Psychological data were collected using an external laptop positioned in close proximity to the participants' seating position. Using the Biopac software, we fitted participants with electrodes to continuously monitor their heart rate throughout the entirety of Experiment 2.
Phase 1. On arrival, participants were calibrated to the eye tracker using a 9-point grid displayed on the computer screen. Once calibrated, participants were provided with onscreen instructions and a familiarization hazard-perception clip. The provision of self-statements or no self-statements followed the procedures used in Experiment 1. Participants were asked to summarize the content of the self-statements in their own words before self-reporting the intensity and perceived of helpfulness of their preperformance anxiety, as well as their motivation toward the upcoming task. Prior to the HPT, participants were asked to take a few moments to refamiliarize themselves and engage with the given set of self-statements or to think (baseline) and prepare themselves for the upcoming performance (specific instructions are available from the first author). Immediately prior to and between each of the three randomized hazardperception clips, participants were recalibrated using drift-correct measures. On completion, participants remained connected to the MP45 Biopac to monitor their heart rate before proceeding to Phase 2.
Phase 2. As in Phase 1, participants were asked to read a new set of competitive instructions regarding the BHT and provided with verbal instructions on how to complete a BHT. Specifically, participants were asked to sit comfortably in a chair, to pinch their nose, and to hold their breath for as long as possible, even if they felt the urge to breathe again (Sütterlin et al., 2013) . Once familiarized and practiced with this technique, the participant was provided with and asked to adopt self-statements that were tailored to their performance in the BHT. As used in Phase 1, participants then completed a series of self-report measures before taking a moment to refamiliarize themselves and engage with the self-statements and prepare for the BHT. At the end, participants were asked to complete measures of perceived mental effort and compliance with the BHT. Additionally, in reference to both the hazard-perception and breath-holding tasks, participants self-reported their perceptions of the self-statements (see online Appendix B for data collection process).
Data analysis. The statistical analysis procedures followed those use in Experiment 1.
Results
Preliminary analyses.
Manipulations check. All 35 participants indicated successful understanding of the selfstatements. In reference to both hazardperception and breath-holding tasks, statistical analysis revealed that regardless of the condition, participants were equally engaged with the self-statements (M ϭ 4.37, SD ϭ 1.64), t(69) ϭ 22.26, p Ͻ .001. Analysis also indicated that engagement with the self-statements did not differ between irrational and rational selfstatement conditions after controlling for trait irrational beliefs, F(1, 33) ϭ 2.84, p ϭ .10.
Task engagement. As in Experiment 1, statistical analysis was conducted to test participants' motivation toward both that hazardperception and breath-holding tasks using a single self-report item. Analysis of self-report data revealed that regardless of the condition, participants were engaged with both the HPT (M ϭ 5.23, SD ϭ .97), t(104) ϭ 55.05, p Ͻ .001, and BHT (M ϭ 5.07, SD ϭ 1.32), t(104) ϭ 39.41, p Ͻ .001. Furthermore, analysis indicated engagement with the self-statements did not differentiate between baseline and the irrational and rational self-statement conditions in both the HPT, F(2, 33) ϭ .22, p ϭ .81, and BHT, F(2, 33) ϭ .415, p ϭ .66. Statistical analysis also revealed that regardless of the condition, participants were engaged with the HPT, as indicated by mean increases in heart rate scores (M ϭ 2.67, SD ϭ 4.91), t(104) ϭ 5.58, p Ͻ .001. In addition, participants did not differentiate in heart rate increases between baseline (M ϭ 3.06, SD ϭ 5.69) and the irrational (M ϭ 2.35, SD ϭ 4.39) and rational (M ϭ 2.61, SD ϭ 4.68), F(2, 33) ϭ .20, p ϭ .82, self-statement conditions. Statistical analysis showed that regardless of the condition, participants reported compliance with the BHT, as indicated by three items on a BHT compliance measure (M ϭ 6.28, SD ϭ 1.46), t(104) ϭ 44.08, p Ͻ .001. Furthermore, analysis indicated participants did not differ in BHT compliance between baseline (M ϭ 6.11, SD ϭ 1.56) and the irrational (M ϭ 6.35, SD ϭ 1.56) and rational (M ϭ 6.39, SD ϭ 1.29) selfstatement conditions, F(2, 33) ϭ .86, p ϭ .68.
Main analyses. The main analyses are presented in three sections. The effects of irrational and rational self-statements on outcomes measures are reported in reference to the modified HPT and BHT in the first two sections (see Table 1 ). The final section reports participants' perceptions of helpfulness and believability of the self-statements between the irrational and rational conditions.
Hazard-perception task.
Hazard-perception performance. To test the effects of irrational and rational selfstatements on hazard-perception performance, we conducted a one-way analysis of covariance. Statistical analysis reported no significant differences between the irrational and rational selfstatement conditions after controlling for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores, F(1, 32) ϭ .94, p ϭ .18, 2 ϭ .06. Visual gaze behavior. To examine the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on participants' performance efficiency, after adjusting for baseline and trait irrational beliefs, we conducted two one-way analyses of covariance. Analysis revealed no significant main effects between self-statement conditions in mean fixation duration during the presence of the major hazard, F(1, 32) ϭ .58, p ϭ .45, 2 ϭ .02. Further statistical analysis also revealed no significant differences in time taken to first fixation of the major hazard, F(1, 32) ϭ .59, p ϭ .45, 2 ϭ .02. Preperformance anxiety. Two one-way analyses of covariance were used to investigate differences in the intensity and the directional interpretation of preperformance anxiety between the irrational and rational self-statement conditions prior to the HPT. After controlling for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores, analysis revealed no significant differences in intensity, F(1, 32) ϭ .08, p ϭ .78, Wilks's ϭ .99, 2 ϭ .00, or the directional interpretation of preperformance anxiety, F(1, 32) ϭ .62, p ϭ .44, Wilks's ϭ .98, 2 ϭ .02. Physiological arousal. To examine the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on participant's physiological arousal, we conducted a one-way analysis of covariance. No significant effects were found in heart rate between conditions after controlling for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores, F(1, 32) ϭ 1.82, p ϭ .67, 2 ϭ .01. Breath-holding task. Task persistence and perceived mental effort. Two one-way analyses of covariance were used to examine differences in task persistence and perceived mental effort between the irrational and rational self-statement conditions during a BHT. After controlling for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores, analysis revealed no significant differences in task persistence, F(1, 32) ϭ 1.63, p ϭ .21, Wilks's ϭ .95, 2 ϭ .05, or perceived mental effort, F(1, 32) ϭ 3,81, p ϭ .06, Wilks's ϭ .89, 2 ϭ .11. Preperformance anxiety. Two one-way analyses of covariance were used to investigate differences in the intensity and the directional interpretation of participants' preperformance anxiety for the irrational and rational selfstatement conditions prior to the BHT. After adjusting for trait irrational beliefs and baseline scores, analysis revealed no significant differences in intensity, F(1, 32) ϭ .31, p ϭ .58, Wilks's ϭ .99, 2 ϭ .01, or the directional interpretation of preperformance anxiety, F(1, 32) ϭ .56, p ϭ .46, Wilks's ϭ .98, 2 ϭ .02. Physiological arousal. To examine the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on changes in physiological arousal, as measured by changes in heart rate, we conducted a oneway analysis of covariance. After controlling for total irrational belief scores and baseline scores, analysis revealed no main effects between the irrational and rational self-statement conditions, F(1, 32) ϭ 1.67, p ϭ .21, 2 ϭ .05. Self-statement perception. Statistical analysis was conducted to examine participants' perceived helpfulness of the self-statements between the irrational and rational conditions for both the hazard-perception and breath-holding tasks. After controlling for total irrational belief scores, a one-way analysis of covariance reported no significant effect in perceived helpfulness for both the HPT, F(1, 33) ϭ 2.41, p ϭ .13, 2 ϭ .07, and the BHT, F(1, 33) ϭ 1.86, p ϭ .18, 2 ϭ .05. The results indicate that irrespective of the condition, participants reported no difference in perceived helpfulness between the rational self-statements (RSS) and irrational self-statements (ISS) for both the HPT (RSS: M ϭ 4.83, SD ϭ 1.40; ISS: M ϭ 3.46, SD ϭ 1.82) and BHT (RSS: M ϭ 4.86, SD ϭ 1.48; ISS: M ϭ 3.77, SD ϭ 1.94). In reference to both the HPT and BHT, a one-way analysis of covariance reported significant differences in the believability of self-statements between the irrational (M ϭ 3.74, SD ϭ 1.82) and rational (M ϭ 5.17, SD ϭ 1.48) self-statements after controlling for trait irrational beliefs, F(1, 33) ϭ 1.66, p ϭ .21, 2 ϭ .05.
Discussion
Experiment 2 sought to extend the findings from Experiment 1 by assessing the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on objective measures of performance and performance efficiency during a competitive hazard-perception task as well as task persistence during a breath-holding task. As in Experiment 1, data indicated no differences in competitive performance, performance efficiency, task persistence, mental effort, or preperformance anxiety (self-reported and heart rate) between the irrational and rational self-statement conditions.
REBT theory indicates that the endorsement of rational beliefs is unhelpful, whereas irrational beliefs hinder performance (Dryden & Branch, 2008) . In Experiment 2, both fixation duration to detected hazard and time taken to fixate on the major hazard were assessed as objective and sensitive indicators of performance efficiency predictive of hazardperception performance (G. Wood et al., 2016) . The present findings indicated no differences in performance effectiveness or efficiency between the irrational and rational self-statement groups and accordingly support the results of Experiment 1, while contrasting with findings in previous studies (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Kombos et al., 1989; Schill et al., 1978) . To further understand the effects of beliefs, Turner and Barker (2014) suggested when encountering adversity (i.e., sporting competition), irrational beliefs may harbor motivational qualities. However, in line with previous research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) , both task persistence and perceived mental effort were not differentiated by either an irrational or a rational approach toward a competitive task. In contrast to the findings in previous studies, our findings suggest irrational beliefs did not enhance self-reported preperformance anxiety (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) or lead to higher levels of physiological arousal (e.g., Master & Gershman, 1983) when approaching the competitive hazard-perception or breathholding task. Furthermore, an irrational or rational approach did not determine differences in the perceived helpfulness of the preperformance anxiety. Notably, however, significant differences were recorded in the believability between the self-statement groups, with participants reporting irrational self-statements to be less believable compared to rational alternatives.
General Discussion
The investigation into understanding human beliefs offers important implications for research and practice aiming to enhance human functioning across various performance contexts. In the present study, we aimed to examine the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on acute performance, as well as important psychological outcomes previously associated with performance. Collectively, the findings disconfirmed the study hypotheses, challenging previous research that indicated irrational self-statements were associated with reduced task performance (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Schill et al., 1978) . In addition, the results challenge predictions of REBT theory that irrational beliefs hinder, whereas rational beliefs are helpful toward, performance. There exists a plethora of research supporting the detrimental effects of irrational beliefs on psychological health (e.g., David et al., 2005; Vîslȃ et al., 2016) that have also been supported in the context of elite sport (e.g., emotional and physical exhaustion; Turner & Moore, 2015) . Nonetheless, the results indicate that participants did not differ in their behavioral performance (i.e., golf-putting performance) or performance efficiency (i.e., eye gaze data) when adopting an irrational or rational approach toward a real-life competitive task. To ex-plain, REBT theory merely posits irrational beliefs to be associated with maladaptive behaviors common in clinical settings (e.g., increased anger, self-harming, procrastination; Dryden & Branch, 2008) . Further, previous research examining the effects of irrational self-statements on behavior has been scant and fraught with methodological shortcomings, and the precise short-term effects of irrational beliefs have remained equivocal. Ultimately, evidence supporting the adverse effects of irrational beliefs on performance has been meager; thus, the notion that for some, irrational beliefs may enhance performance is one that should be seriously considered.
Contrary to the case in previous research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) , no differences were reported in preperformance anxiety or perceived helpfulness of preperformance anxiety, and accordingly, no differences were reported in concentration disruption. Acknowledging the limitations of self-report measures (J. M. Williams & Krane, 1992) and in line with previous research (e.g., Harris, Davies, & Dryden, 2006) , objective measures of physiological arousal were used in the present study. Whilst increases in heart rate suggested participants were engaged with the competitive task, results indicate participants did not differ in physiological arousal whether adopting irrational or rational selfstatements.
Researchers have proposed irrational beliefs may harbor motivational qualities (Turner & Barker, 2014) , subsequently encouraging perseverance in the face of hedonic costs in an attempt to realize long-term ambitions, certainly an important component of adaptive functioning (L. A. Williams & DeSteno, 2008) . However, in line with previous research (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) , the results indicated no differences in task persistence or perceived mental effort between a rational and irrational approach to a competitive performance. Offering a nuanced view, researchers have proposed that irrational and rational beliefs may differ in the quality of motivation rather than the intensity (Turner, 2016) . The core irrational belief of demandingness (e.g., should, must) has been compared to introjected regulation, where actions are self-imposed in an attempt to avoid shame or guilt or ego enhancement underpinned by the sense one "should" take part. Introjected regulation has been associated with expending greater effort, yet it is also related to higher anxiety and reduced ability to cope with failure (Turner, 2016) . The effects of irrational and/or rational beliefs on motivational quality may offer further insight into the precise effects on performance and warrants further investigation.
We suggest that, based on the findings, for some, irrational beliefs may be helpful toward performance. Nevertheless, considering the prevalence of mental health disorders in performance contexts such as elite sport (Hughes & Leavey, 2012) , ethically practitioners would not encourage the adoption of irrational beliefs in the pursuit of performance excellence. In addition, no evidence exists to suggest irrational beliefs offer advantages above those of rational beliefs. Ultimately, we put forth a less polarized view as to the effects of irrational and rational beliefs on performance, acknowledging that for some, thinking irrationally may be advantageous in the pursuit of short-term goals yet detrimental for one's psychological health in the long term. REBT theory itself may offer an explanation for the paradoxical effects of irrational beliefs on psychological well-being and performance. Specifically, although rational beliefs are categorized as empirically true, logical, and pragmatic (i.e., helpful; Digiuseppe et al., 2013) , REBT theorists have ignored the proposition that irrational beliefs can deny all logic and empirical arguments yet serve a helpful role toward goal achievement (D. S. Wilson, 2010) . Furthermore, the view that irrational beliefs are wholly detrimental is challenged by the notion that humans' beliefs have developed with evolutionary design in response to their environment (Pelusi, 2003) , thus serving adaptive functions for our ancestors where the extreme, dogmatic, and drastic responses would have ensured favorable outcomes were met. Most recently, Turner (2016) has put forth the notion of doublethinking, which asserts that irrational and rational beliefs can exist simultaneously in a transient and stable form. Originally proposed by George Orwell (Orwell, 1949) , double thinking is based on the premise that humans are able to hold two contradictory beliefs in their mind simultaneously and accept both of them. Thus, an athlete may be able to forget any fact or belief that has become inconvenient and to then draw it back only when it is needed. For example, an endurance runner may harbor rational beliefs about adversity that ensure psychological health, yet during the final sections of a race irrational self-talk (e.g., "I must finish, otherwise it would be terrible") may facilitate goal achievement.
Limitations and Future Directions
It is important to understand the results in terms of its limitations, which if addressed could strengthen the study findings. In this study, we examined the effects of irrational and rational self-statements rather than core beliefs. Further, although both self-report and objective measures of heart rate were used to confirm participants' engagement with the study manipulations, the content of selfstatements were not tailored to irrational and rational beliefs pertinent to the participants. To offer a more sensitive and accurate examination, future researchers may wish to tailor core beliefs relevant to the participants as well favor the use of objective measures (i.e., pupil dilation as a measure of mental effort; G. Wood et al., 2016) . The SGABS provided a reliable and validated measure of total general irrational belief scores. However, future researchers would be prudent to adopt the Irrational Performance Beliefs Inventory , a newly validated measure of irrational beliefs tailored to performance contexts, to provide an accurate measure of performance specific beliefs. Rational beliefs and irrational beliefs are proposed to be dichotomous constructs, whereby low levels in one does not necessarily indicate high levels in the other (Bernard, 1998) . Thus, future researchers may wish to explore the interplay between irrational and rational beliefs and the subsequent effects on performance. Research within REBT has proposed a unitary model of emotion that is quantitatively distinct (i.e., high vs. low anxiety) and a binary model of emotion that is qualitatively distinct (i.e., anxiety vs. concern; Hyland & Boduszek, 2012) . To this end, future researchers are recommended to establish a validated and reliable measure of emotion sensitive to measuring both functionality and intensity. Finally, the precise mechanisms by which irrational and rational beliefs effect performance appear to be more complicated than has been previously hypothesized; therefore, future researchers may wish to explore the role of important psychological factors (e.g., self-efficacy) that may mediate the association between beliefs and performance.
Conclusion
The present findings contrast with those of previous research, indicating that the adoption of irrational self-statements did not lead to adverse effects on performance, performance efficiency, persistence, and psychological outcomes above that of rational selfstatements. To this end, we suggest irrational beliefs may have both positive and negative effects on performance, highlighting distinctions in both factual and practical rationality that have been overlooked within the extant literature. The detrimental effects of irrational beliefs for psychological health are established; accordingly, understanding the precise effects and mechanisms by which irrational and rational beliefs affect one's ability to perform has valuable implications for practitioners utilizing REBT within high-performance contexts.
